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Abstract: This paper gauges the effect of financial deepening and bank outreach on informality using 
micro data from the Indian manufacturing sector and exploiting cross-industry variation in the need 
for external finance. We distinguish between two channels through which access to finance can 
reduce informality: reducing the entry barrier to the formal sector and increasing productivity of 
formal firms. We find that bank outreach has a stronger effect on reducing the incidence of 
informality by cutting barriers to entering the formal economy, especially for smaller firms, and thus 
diminishing opportunistic informality. In comparison, financial deepening increases the productivity 
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A large share of private sector activity in developing countries takes place outside the formal 
economy. On the one hand, working in informality implies lower regulatory and tax burden. 
On the other hand, informal firms have limited access to formal services like the legal system 
and they are less likely to hire skilled labor (Boadway and Sato 2010). Critically, informality 
is often associated with lack of access to formal sources of external finance, as both theory 
and empirical work has shown (Straub, 2005; Beck, Lin and Ma, 2014).  It is not clear, 
however, whether this relationship is a causal one and, if yes, what the driving factor is. Does 
lack of access to formal finance discourage entrepreneurs from entering the formal economy 
or does informality prevent them from accessing formal finance? How different is the effect 
of financial deepening on formal and informal firms? This paper exploits state-year variation 
within Indian manufacturing to disentangle the relationship between different types of 
informality and different dimensions of financial sector development, notably financial depth 
(commercial bank credit to SDP) and financial outreach (branch penetration). Following the 
seminal work by Rajan and Zingales (1998), we exploit cross-industry variation in the need 
for external finance to control for endogeneity biases. 
Informality has different dimensions and means different things to different people. 
From one perspective, some firms –or workers– exit from the formal sector based on a 
private cost-benefit analysis of formality, while others are excluded from state benefits 
because of high registration costs and regulatory burden (Perry et al. 2007). From a different 
angle, informality has both inter-firm and intra-firm margins. At the inter-firm margin, some 
firms, working “underground”, completely hide from the state. Others, at the intra-firm 
margin, are partly formal and partly informal which usually happens in the form of 
misreported sales and hidden workers. In this paper, we focus on the interfirm margin of 
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informality, i.e. the exclusion of enterprises from the formal economy, be it voluntarily or 
involuntarily.  
Previous research has shown important links between access to finance and the incidence 
of informality. On the theoretical level, Straub (2005) presents a comprehensive model of a 
firm’s decision between formality and informality, which includes the decision to tap formal 
or informal financial markets and shows how the different constraints discussed in the 
empirical literature affect the threshold size of a company indifferent between formality and 
informality. In this paper, we use a similar conceptual framework for addressing different 
dimensions of informality. Consider an economy in which firms (or entrepreneurs) are 
heterogeneous in initial capital k and can work in either formal or informal sector. The 
productivity is higher in the formal sector, due to access to formal services; however, firms 
have to pay an entry cost to overcome the barrier of formality. This barrier includes 
registration costs, indivisibility of investment and formal property claims, where the latter 
enables entrepreneurs to use her assets as collateral and thus gain access to formal finance. 
Figure 1 plots the production versus initial capital of a firm in the formal and the informal 
sector. The marginal production of capital is decreasing and given the real rental price, the 
profit maximization in the informal sector yields the optimal use of capital as k
*
. The 
intersection of the iso-profit line of k
*
 and formal production curve gives the level of initial 
capital  ̅ above which firms decide to work in the formal sector. Based on the firm’s 
decision, three different regions can be distinguished. In the right area, firms become formal 
and have the highest production and profitability. In the middle, although formality is 
possible, the optimal choice is producing in the informal sector and entrepreneurs thus 
voluntarily self-exclude from formality. The left area stands for firms not possessing enough 
capital to work formally and therefore excluded from the formal sector.  
Insert Figure 1 here 
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In this setting, better access to financial services helps reduce informality through two 
different channels: 
(A)  Increase transparency: Access to finance makes the operation of the enterprise at 
least partly observable and thus reduces asymmetric information and agency 
problems between lender and borrowers, hence facilitating the use of formal finance 
and other formal services. In this way, financial development helps the firm to 
overcome the barriers of formality shifting the formal sector production curve to the 
left (Figure 2.A).  
(B) Enhance productivity: By facilitating transactions using short-term credit and funding 
long-term investment, financial development shifts the productivity of formal firms 
upwards, while it has no significant effect on informal firms, thus increasing the 
benefits of producing in the formal sector (Figure 2.B).  
Insert Figure 2 here 
The transparency channel helps credit constrained firms increase their credibility to 
overcome the entry cost into the formal sector and thus reduces the incidence of informality. 
In contrast, the productivity channel has two effects on informality: (i) it reduces the 
opportunistic informality and the number of firms that voluntarily produce in the informal 
sector; (ii) it increases the production of the formal sector for a fixed level of initial wealth. In 
this framework, Channel (A) is the main mechanism through which finance affects small 
firms. In contrast, the impact of financial development on firms possessing large fixed assets 
is through Channel (B). Moreover, we expect both channels to be stronger in industries that 
are more dependent on external finance.  
We examine these hypotheses using Indian manufacturing data. After examining the 
overall effect of financial development on the incidence of informality, we inspect whether it 
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helps removing formality barriers, by focusing on small firms that are more likely to be 
excluded from the formal sector. To control for endogeneity biases related to reverse 
causation and omitted variables, we follow the seminal work by Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
and exploit cross-industry variation in the need for external finance.  Using a difference-in-
difference set-up, we gauge whether firms in industries more reliant on external finance are 
more likely to be formal in states and years with higher levels of financial development. This 
allows us to control for demand-side effects and for other factors co-varying on the state-year 
level with financial deepening.  We gauge the effect of financial development on both 
intensive and extensive margins of the formal sector, i.e. the number of firms and the total 
production share, and thus both channels discussed above, and focus on two different 
dimensions of financial development, namely depth, proxied by Credit to SDP, and outreach, 
proxied by branch penetration. Financial depth relates to the overall credit volume in the 
economy, independent of which enterprises have access to credit. A high credit volume could 
thus be mapped to different loan size distributions, including loans mainly to large firms.  
Financial or bank outreach relates to the ease of access to financial services, including credit.  
Given the importance of geographic proximity in lending relationships especially of smaller 
firms (Degryse and Ongena, 2005) we conjecture that small firms stand to benefit more from 
financial outreach than large firms.  Although these dimensions are not mutually exclusive, 
the emphasis of one over the other can lead to different policy recommendations.  
Our results suggest that both dimensions of financial development are important for 
increasing the share of formal production in manufacturing. Financial outreach helps reduce 
formality barriers and thus increases the number of formal firms (channel A), whereas 
financial depth mainly affects informality through channel (B), increasing productivity of 
industries dependent on external finance. We also find that this effect is stronger for small 
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firms in the case of financial outreach while financial depth is associated with the incidence 
of formality of larger firms. 
This paper contributes to several literatures. First, we add to the literature on informality. 
An extensive literature has shown that informality almost always has negative consequences 
on the aggregate level. In addition to lack of access to formal services, hiding from the 
government increases distortions and reduces productivity (Gordon and Li 2009). On the 
other hand, informality can indirectly hamper firm growth through lack of infrastructure 
caused by deficits in the government revenue (Kleven et al, 2009). Based on the World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys, La Porta and Shleifer (2014) find high levels of informality in developing 
countries. One of the important differences between formal and informal enterprises is that 
around 44 percent of informal enterprises list access to financing as the main obstacle of 
doing business, whereas this number is 21 and 14 percent for small and large formal 
enterprises, respectively. They also document a large productivity gap between formal and 
informal firms. In line with this, Hesieh and Olken (2014) show sharp differences in 
productivity and human capital of managers between formal and informal firms. Our paper 
investigates how variation in financial sector development across states and over time within 
India can explain incidence of informality and productivity differences between the formal 
and informal sectors.  
This paper is also related to a small but growing literature on the determinants of 
informality, most of which focus on specific factors that can explain the incidence and extent 
of informality. The literature has focused on different areas to explain informality and tax 
evasion. First, high tax rates and other burdensome regulations increase cost and reduce 
benefits of formality (de Soto, 1989; Loayza, 1996; Schneider and Ernste, 2000), although 
low taxation combined with deficient public services can result in similar effects (Johnson et 
al., 2000; Friedman et al., 2000; Dabla-Norris et al., 2008). The relationship between labor 
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market rigidities and informality, on the other hand, seems to be relatively robust (Loayza, 
1996; Botero et al., 2004), as is the effect of entry regulations (Djankov et al., 2003; Klapper 
et al., 2006). Second, weak institutions that allow rent seeking and predatory behavior by 
government officials drive firms into informality, an explanation often applied to post-
transition economies in Eastern Europe (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993, 1994). A third 
explanation is that firms try to hide their profits from criminal gangs (Zhuravskaya and Frye, 
2000). Fourth, deficiencies in the legal framework (Johnson et al., 1998) reduce the benefits 
of formality – being able to enforce contracts through the court system and thus being able to 
deal with a broader set of trading partners at arms-length.  In our empirical assessment, we 
thus have to discriminate between legal system deficiencies and financial sector development 
not related to the legal system.  Finally, several empirical papers have shown the importance 
of financial constraints in explaining variation in informality.  A recent cross-country study 
shows that firms are more likely to produce in the formal sector in countries with more 
effective credit registries and higher branch penetration, an effect that is stronger for smaller 
and geographically more remote firms and firms in industries with a higher dependence on 
external finance (Beck, Lin and Ma, 2014). Compared to this literature, we exploit within-
country variation in financial development and compare the effect of two different 
dimensions of financial development, depth and outreach. 
Second, we add to a large literature on the real effects of financial deepening. Starting 
with King and Levine (1993 a,b), a large literature using different aggregation levels and 
measures of financial depth has shown a positive relationship between financial depth and 
economic growth, a relationship that goes more through productivity growth than capital 
accumulation (e.g., Beck et al., 2000). While the recent crisis and recent studies have shown 
important non-linearities (e.g., Arcand et al., 2012), there seems a wide-spread consensus in 
the literature on a strong effect of financial deepening on economic growth for developing 
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countries, such as India. The literature has also related financial development to financing 
obstacles of small and medium-sized enterprises, showing that obstacles are lower in 
countries with higher levels of financial development (Beck et al., 2006) and that these 
obstacles are less growth constraining in countries with deeper financial systems (Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005).   Our paper adds to this literature by relating within-
country variation in financial development to the incidence of formality, thus another 
important channel through which financial sector development can impact the level and 
structure of GDP. Unlike previous papers, we also distinguish specifically between the two 
dimensions of financial depth (focus of most of the finance and growth literature) and 
financial outreach.  
Finally, our paper also adds to a flourishing literature on economic development in India, 
which has linked sub-national variation in historic experiences and policies to differences in 
growth, poverty levels, political outcomes and other dependent variables (see Besley et al., 
2007 for an earlier survey). Specifically, researchers have focused on differences in political 
accountability (Besley and Burgess, 2002; Pande, 2003), labor market regulation (Besley and 
Burgess, 2004; Hasan, Mitra, and Ramaswamy, 2007; Dougherty, Robles, and Krishna, 
2011), land reform (Besley and Burgess, 2000; Banerjee and Iyer, 2005), trade liberalization 
(Topalova, 2010; Edmonds et al., 2010) and gender inequality (Iyer et al., 2012). Directly 
related to our paper, Burgess and Pande (2005) relate a social banking policy on branching to 
differences in poverty alleviation across states. Ayyagari, Beck and Hoseini (2013) explore 
the relationship between financial deepening post-1991 liberalization and poverty-levels. Our 
paper adds to this literature by focusing on cross-state differences in financial deepening after 
the 1991 liberalization episode and by comparing the effects of two different dimensions of 
financial development – total credit volume and branch penetration of financial institutions – 
on the incidence of informality. 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data we will 
be using and section 3 the methodology. Section 4 discusses our results and section 5 
concludes.  
2. Data 
This section describes the different data sources and variables we use to gauge the 
relationship between the incidence of informality and access to formal sources of external 
finance. Specifically, this section describes (i) the indicators of informality, (ii) the indicators 
of financial depth and outreach, and (iii) the industry characteristics that allow us to gauge the 
differential impact of financial sector development on the incidence of informality across 
different industries. 
2.1. Gauging the incidence of informality  
We use firm-level surveys for the formal and informal sectors to construct gauges of the 
incidence of informality on the state-industry level.  Specifically, we have available data for 
the Indian manufacturing sector for 5 years: 1989-90, 1994-95, 2000-01, 2005-06, and 2010-
11. Each year has two data sources: (i) the annual survey of industries (ASI) and (ii) the 
national sample survey on unorganized manufacturing sectors (NSS). The ASI covers 
factories employing above 10 employees using power and those with 20 employees or more 
without using power. In each year, all factories with more than 100 employees plus at least 
12% of the rest are sampled. The sample is representative at the state and 4-digit NIC code 
levels.
1
 The second data source is the NSS enterprise survey which covers small 
manufacturing units that are not covered by ASI. Its sampling strategy is based on the number 
of enterprises in each village/town. Sample weights which show the number of firms the 
                                                 
1
 Up to 4-digit level, the NIC code is identical in structure to International Standard of Industrial Classification 
(ISIC). In the additional digits, it incorporates the national characteristics. 
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sample represents are provided for both surveys. Table 1 shows the number of observations 
for each ASI and NSS surveys across the five waves.
2
 
Insert Table 1 here 
To gauge the incidence of informality, we use two dummy variables at the enterprise 
level. The first one refers to general registration and indicates whether the enterprise is 
registered under any act or authority. The second one is tax registration and indicates 
whether the firm is registered with the tax authorities or not. All sampled firms in ASI are 
registered under the Factories Act and are taxpayers. The NSS sample surveys have 
information about registration under any act or agency. We can find out about tax registration 
by checking whether the firm pays any sales tax (distributive expenses) or not. Thus, a firm is 
registered for tax if it is in ASI or it is in NSS and has nonzero distributive expenses. We do 
not have information about tax registration or payment in NSS 89, and therefore, we use this 
year just for the regression of general registration. 
We use the information on firms’ registration status to construct six different indicators 
of informality on the aggregate level. Table 2.A shows the weighted averages of the different 
registration indices in each year. The first two rows show general and tax registration rate 
among firms. Each observation is weighted with the number of firms it represents. The 
general registration rate increased from 8 percent to 12 percent between 1989 and 1994, 
declined in 2000 and 2005 to 10 percent, before it went up again to 15 percent in 2010. The 
tax registration rate slightly increased till 2005 but doubled from 2005 to 2010, when around 
3 percent of firms were registered with tax authorities. Considering the value-added share of 
formal and informal firms instead of the numbers gives a somewhat different picture. In rows 
(3) and (4) we present the weighted sum of the value-added of registered firms divided by the 
                                                 
2
 Given the variation in NSS coverage, we are concerned that the surveyed firm population might vary 
significantly over time.  When comparing the share of firms in externally dependent industries across the five 
survey waves, however, we cannot any significant trend correlation with NSS coverage.  
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weighted sum of the value-added of all firms. The numbers indicates that although the 
number of registered and tax-paying firms is small, they comprise a big and growing slice of 
the value added in the manufacturing sector, reaching 93 and 89 percent in 2010, 
respectively.  Finally, the numbers in rows (5) and (6) are employment shares of formal firms 
which equal the weighted sum of the number of workers of registered firms over the 
weighted sum of the workers of all firms. The trends in the value-added and employment is 
similar to the number of firms, first dropping and then increasing again.  
Insert Table 2 here 
To examine the robustness of our measure, we cross-check the overall numbers with 
comparable GDP estimations of Indian manufacturing sector published by Central Statistical 
Office (CSO), Government of India. Table 2.B compares the official estimation of net 
manufacturing GDP in India versus our estimations of gross output and value-added, using 
2005 as the base year. The official estimations are at constant price and account for 
depreciation. We also normalize our estimated values by state level price indices,
3
 but our 
measures are in gross terms. There are several reasons for differences across the different 
variables. First, they might be due to differences in price adjustment and depreciation. In 
addition, the CSO publishes net GDP data on registered and unregistered manufacturing. 
Compared to our methodology, the CSO’s estimation is based on labor input and production 
per labor, counting just firms in ASI as the registered sectors.
4
 Since we also take into 
account registered enterprises in the NSS that are not covered in ASI, our estimates of formal 
production tend to be higher. Nevertheless, we observe parallel trends in the value-added 
share of firm registered under any act and in similar estimations by CSO.  
                                                 
3
 The price index is published by Labour Bureau as “consumer price index for industrial workers”. 
4
 The methodology of CSO’s is described at: http://mospi.nic.in/Mospi_New/upload/brochure_ 2004-05.pdf 
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Appendix Table A1 provides the average share of registered firms across industries, both 
using general and tax registration and across the three dimensions of (i) share of firms, (ii) 
share of value added and (iii) share of employees, as well as the number of firms these 
averages are based on, averaged over the five survey waves.  We note a substantial variation 
across industries in the incidence of informality. While in Mining and Quarrying 100% of 
activities are undertaken in registered companies, only 3% of companies in the tobacco 
industry are registered under any act and less than 0.5% are registered with tax authorities, 
even though their share in total employment is over 11% and their share in value added over 
58%.  
Appendix Table A2 provides similar information on the incidence of informality across 
states, again averaging over the five survey waves. While over 40 percent of firms are 
registered in Goa, only one percent are registered in Orissa. Figure 3 provides graphical 
illustration of cross-state variation of registration average over time and industries. 
Insert Figure 3 here 
We use these indices of informality on the firm-level to compute gauges of the incidence 
of informality on the state-year-industry level. Specifically, we combine the firm-level data of 
ASI and NSS and then collapse them at state-year-industry level using sample weights. Since 
sampling in NSS is based on location not industry, we aggregate our measure just to 2-digit 
industry codes. Specifically, we construct indicators of formality based on the share of firms, 
share of value added and share of employees, both for general registration and tax 
registration. Overall, we have 35 states, 5 years, and 33 industries, but the number of 
observations is only 4,180 because smaller states do not host all industries. In the regressions, 
we have fewer observations because of missing data on some of the independent variables in 
some states, industries and years. Table 3 Panel A provides the descriptive statistics on our 
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indicators. On average, 11.3 percent of firms are registered under any act, but only 2.1 
percent for tax authorities.  
Insert Table 3 here 
2.2. State level indicators of financial development and control variables 
We construct several time-variant indicators of financial and economic development as 
well as tax enforcement on the state-level. Panel A of Table 3 provides descriptive statistics 
of the time-variant state-level variables. Appendix Table A2 provides state-level averages of 
the different variables. 
The post-1991 period has seen rapid financial deepening in India, though with important 
differences across Indian states. As documented in Ayyagari, Beck and Hoseini (2013), 
following a severe balance of payments crisis in 1991, there was a substantial liberalization 
of India’s financial sector as part of an economy-wide liberalization process. These reforms 
included de-regulation of interest rates, reduction in the volume of directed credit and entry 
of new privately-owned financial institutions. Reforms of the regulatory and supervisory 
framework and the contractual environment also supported financial deepening in the 
subsequent decades. As documented by Ayyagari et al. (2013), however, this financial 
deepening process was uneven across different Indian states. This heterogeneity over time 
and across states provides us a rich identification tool that we can relate to variation in the 
incidence of informality, as we will discuss in the following. 
First, we use two indicators of financial sector development, capturing the two 
dimensions of financial depth and financial outreach.  Specifically, Credit to SDP is 
outstanding amount of credit utilized in each state divided by State Domestic Product. It 
corresponds to a standard cross-country indicator, Private Credit to GDP, which has been 
extensively used in the finance-growth literature (e.g. Beck et al., 2000). We use its 
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logarithmic form to control for non-linearities, as typically done in the cross-country 
literature exploring the effects of financial deepening. Our measure of financial outreach is 
Branches per capita and is the number of bank branches per 10,000 people in each state and 
year. Average Credit to SDP varies from 11% in Nagaland and Manipur to 135% in 
Chandigarh, while branches per capita is 0.42 in Bihar ranging up to 3.42 in Goa.  
In investigating the link between financial development and informality, we also control 
for several other time-varying state characteristics. SDP per capita is net state domestic 
product per capita at constant price and a proxy for income levels, and State Government 
Expenditure to SDP is total state government expenses over SDP. Higher economic 
development and better public service provision might reduce barriers to formality for 
enterprises.  Critically, as one of our formality gauges refers to tax payments, we control for 
tax enforcement per firm, which is the component of state government expenditure on 
collection of taxes and duties divided by the estimated number of firms in the state. Hence, it 
measures tax enforcement expenditure per firm in each state. SDP per capita ranges from 
8677 in Bihar to 80935 in Chandigarh. Government expenditures average 19 percent of SDP, 
ranging from 0.071 in Delhi to 1.119 in Sikkim. Finally, enforcement expenditures per firm 
range from 0.053 in West Bengal to 4.803 in Delhi.  
 
2.3.Industry characteristics 
To explore the differential effect of state-level policies on informality in different 
industries, we use an industry characteristic that captures the need for financial services and 
thus the potential benefit of access to formal finance or opportunity costs of informality.  
Specifically, we use the RZ index of financial dependence which is from Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) and equals the median of firm level measure “(capital expenditures – cash 
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flow)/capital expenditure averaged over 1980s” for 36 industries. This indicator, computed 
for a group of large listed enterprises in the U.S., for which the supply curve can be expected 
to be almost perfectly elastic, is supposed to indicate the need for external finance based on 
inherent industry characteristics and is exogenous to the actual use of external finance by 
firms in India. As our sample period spans the 1990s and 2000s in India and this measure is 
computed for the U.S. in the 1980s, concerns on different technologies in both countries 
might not be as critical. The level of dependence on external finance shows the potential 
benefits for firms from being formal and having access to formal financial services. Appendix 
Table A1 shows that external dependence ranges from -0.45 in tobacco industry to 1.06 in 
office and computing machinery. 
In addition, we employ another industry-level index to capture the exogenous variation 
in tax compliance. The Indian taxation of enterprises comprises direct and indirect taxation 
on both central and state level. While direct taxes are mainly levied by the central 
government, the main source of states’ tax income is their sales tax. Union excise duties on 
all manufacturing products and service tax on services are also levied by the central 
government. Excise duties, covering all manufacturing products, turned to the VAT –named 
MODVAT– in 1985 and expanded to ad-valorem rates in 1993 for the majority of products. 
Hoseini (2014) shows that under the value-added tax system, upstream industries that are 
forwardly linked to others have higher risk of detection and thus are more likely to be formal. 
As over the period of our study, the manufacturing sector of India has been under the value-
added tax, we measure the forward linkages of each industry to capture the exogenous 
variation in the risk of noncompliance in the value-added tax system. The forward linkages 
index, based on Rasmusen (1958), is the row sum of Leontief inverse matrix of Indian 
economy reflecting the flow of products going to other industries not final consumers. 




X, where X is 
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the diagonal matrix of production and A is the Leontief coefficient matrix. This index is 
calculated for each industry using the input-output tables of the Indian economy. The I-O 
tables are available for 1993-94, 1998-99, and 2003-04 and we use the average of the index 
over time.  The indicator ranges from 0.27 in tobacco products to 2.07 in basic metals. 
Panel B of Table 3 presents correlations across the different state-industry level 
variables. We find that the share of firms registered under any act or under tax authorities is 
positively correlated with both financial sector indicators, with both industry characteristics, 
with SDP per capita and with enforcement expenditures per firm and negatively with 
government expenditures to SDP.  Credit to SDP and branch penetration are positively 
correlated with each other, with a correlation coefficient of 58 percent.  However, other state-
level variables are also significantly correlated with financial development. Finally, external 
dependence and forward linkages are positively and significantly correlated with each other, 
with a correlation coefficient of 0.5. 
 
3. Ocular econometrics and methodology 
Before presenting regression results on the relationship between financial development and 
informality this section provides some preliminary facts about this relationship using Indian 
manufacturing data and explains our methodology to identify the significance of each 
channel. 
Figure 4 plots the general and tax registration rate versus our two financial development 
variables across states. It can be seen that both financial variables have a positive relationship 
with general and tax registration rates, but the observations of branches per capita and tax 
registration are more concentrated along the fitted line, compared to the other three 
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relationships. Both relationships are significant at the 1 percent level for branches per capita 
and at the 5 percent level for credit to SDP. 
As shown in Figure 2.A, theory suggests that one effect of access to finance on 
informality is cutting the barrier to formality and enabling firms to overcome the costs of 
formality. To identify this mechanism, we focus on the sample of smaller firms that are more 
likely to be excluded from the formal sector. Figure 5 plots registration rates versus our 
financial development indicators for the sample of smaller firms, defined as establishments 
with fixed assets less than the 25
th
 percentile of the respective industry in each year. The 
figure suggests a positive relationship between formality and branches per capita, with a 
higher slope than in the overall sample (significant at the 1 percent level), while the 
relationship with credit to SDP is insignificant.  
The second channel through which finance can alleviate informality is increasing 
productivity of the formal sector (Figure 2.B). As mentioned above, this channel has two 
effects: reducing opportunistic informality and boosting the production of formal sector 
firms. In order to identify this channel, we employ the exogenous variation in the dependence 
on external finance among industries. In Figure 6, we compare the registration and financial 
outreach relationship between two groups of industries: above the 75
th
 and below the 25
th
 
percentiles of the RZ index of financial dependence. It can be clearly seen that the positive 
relationship is stronger for industries with larger need for external finance suggesting less 
opportunistic informality in these industries. In Figure 7, we use the same structure to 
compare the link between production and financial depth in the formal and informal sector. 
This figure shows that in the formal sector, production of industries more reliant on external 
finance is highly sensitive to credit to SDP (significant at 1 percent level), while this 
sensitivity is much less for other industries. One the other hand, this pattern is much weaker 
and insignificant in the informal sector.  
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 To formally estimate the overall effect of state-level financial development on 
registration rates, we use different methodologies. First, we use the following difference-in-
difference setting as the baseline.  
infist = ai + bs + ct + α1 FDst + α2 Enfst + α3 Xst + εist  (1) 
where infist is one of the informality indices in industry i, state s and year t. ai, bs , ct  are 
industry, state and year fixed effects, respectively, FDst is one of our two financial 
development indicators in state s and year t, Enfst  is enforcement expenditure per firm in state 
s and year t, and Xist is a vector of control variables including log of SDP per capita at 
constant prices and government expenditure to SDP.     
Because our regressions are for the whole of India, in each regression, we use the 
estimated number of firms in state s, year t, and industry i as weights for the observations. In 
addition, to control for the underestimated standard error in the difference-in-difference 
setting, as suggested by Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004), we cluster our estimation 
at the state level. 
To estimate the differential effect of state-level financial development and enforcement 
activity on the incidence of informality across firms with different needs for external finance, 
we utilize the following difference-in-difference setting for estimation.  
infist = ai + bs × ct + β1 RZi × FDst + β2 RZi × Xst + β3 FLi× Yst + εist  (2) 
where RZi is the Rajan-Zingales index of external dependence for industry i, and FLi is 
forward linkage for industry i, Yst  is a vector of state-level log of enforcement per firm, and 
the rest of variables are the same as equation (1). By saturating the model with industry and 
state-year fixed effects, we focus on the relative effect that time-variant state-level variables 
have on the incidence of informality on the state-industry-year level. In order to examine the 
production enhancing effect of finance on the formal sector, we utilize the same regression 
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setup as (2), but instead of the incidence of formality, we use the levels of production and 
value-added in formal and informal sectors as the dependent variable. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
The results in Columns (1) to (4) of Table 4 show the overall effect of financial 
development on the share of firms registered under any act or tax authorities. While we find 
a significant relationship between branches per capita and the share of formal enterprises 
registered under tax authorities, Credit to SDP does not enter significantly. Neither variable 
enters significantly in the regression of share of firms registered under any act. The 
economic effect of the relationship between branch penetration and formality is significant, 
however.  Specifically, the standard deviation of branches per capita de-trended for state and 
year effects is 0.045 and this variation explains 0.045×9.09= 0.41 percentage point in tax 
registration which on average is 2.05 percent. 
Insert Table 4 here 
In the rest of Table 4, we estimate the same equation, but for sub-samples of firms with 
smaller fixed assets to capture the effect of financial development on firms that are more 
likely to be excluded from the formal sector. Specifically, we select firms whose total fixed 
assets are below the 25
th
 percentile of their industries in each year, and re-compute the 
informality measures and the sample weights.
5
 Columns (5) to (8) show that for the sample of 
smaller firms the effect of financial penetration is significant for both general and tax 
registration. Moreover, financial depth is positively associated with tax registration and less 
robustly with general registration for smaller firms. In terms of the economic size of the 
relationship, financial outreach has more explanatory power for the incidence of informality 
                                                 
5
 The results are robust to using the percentiles just within industry or irrespective of the industry. They are 
stronger for smaller percentiles. 
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than financial deepening. For instance, for the sample of firms below 25
th
 percentile, one de-
trended standard deviation increase in branches per capita and credit to SDP increases tax 
registration rate by 0.045×16.28 = 0.73 and 0.138×2.46 = 0.34 percentage point, respectively.  
Overall, the estimations suggest that financial development reduces exclusion from the 
formal sector by reducing entry barriers to the formal sector, a relationship stronger for 
smaller firms; we also find that broadening access plays a more important role than financial 
deepening.
6
  These results, however, are based on average estimations across industries with 
different needs for external finance.  The estimates are also subject to endogeneity biases, 
related to reverse causation (a higher share of formal firms demanding more formal finance 
and thus increasing both credit volume and outreach by financial institutions) and omitted 
variables that might drive both reduction in informality and financial deepening and 
broadening. In the following, we will therefore explore the differential relationship between 
financial development and the incidence of informality across industries with different needs 
for external finance.  
The results in Table 5 show that the positive association of financial development and 
the share of firms registered under any act and registered with tax authorities, are stronger in 
industries that rely more on external finance.  In columns (1) and (2), we interact the two 
financial development variables on the state-year level with external dependence on the 
industry level, including state-year and industry fixed effects. Both interaction terms enter 
positively and significantly at 1% level.  To control for the fact that financial development 
and formality are correlated with income levels and other government policies, we also 
include interaction terms of external dependence with the log of SDP per capita and 
government expenditures to SDP. While these interaction terms enter positively but 
                                                 
6
 Given the high correlation between the two financial sector variables, we only include one of them at a time. If 
we include both at the same time, we find that just outreach is significant in Table 4. We also ran regressions 
without SDP per capita, given its high correlation with financial development and confirm our findings.  
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insignificantly in the regression including the interaction between Credit to SDP and external 
dependence, they enter negatively and insignificantly in the regression including the 
interaction of external dependence and branches per capita. In columns (3) and (4), we also 
control for the interaction of forward linkages with both state-level enforcement expenditures 
per firm and the log of SDP per capita, While neither of them enters significantly, the 
financial development interaction terms continue to enter significantly with similar 
coefficient sizes. 
Insert Table 5 here 
The results in columns (5) to (8) confirm our findings, when using the tax registration 
definition of formality rather than registration under any act. Both branches per capita and 
credit to SDP interacted with external dependence enter positively and significantly. In 
addition, consistent with Hoseini (2014), the forward linkage interaction terms are positively 
associated with tax registration (columns 7 and 8).  
The findings of Table 5 are not only statistically, but also economically significant. The 
difference-in-differences estimation suggest that going from a state at the 25
th
 percentile of 
branches per capita (Jharkhand = 0.55) to a state at the 75
th
 percentile (Kerala = 1.14) and an 
industry at the 25
th
 percentile of the RZ external dependence index (basic metals = 0.03) to an 
industry at the 75
th
 percentile of external dependence (motor vehicles = 0.39) results in an 
increase in registration under any act by 22.71×0.59×0.36=4.8 percentage points and an 





percentiles of credit to SDP are Uttar Pradesh (0.19) and Andhra Pradesh (0.36); the 
differential effects for Credit to SDP are therefore 2.73 and 0.55 percentage points, 
respectively.
7
 This compares to a mean registration rate of 11.3 percent and 2.1 percent under 
                                                 
7
 For general and tax registration rates the effects are 11.9 × log(0.36/0.19) × 0.36 = 2.73 and 2.38 × 
log(0.36/0.19) × 0.36 = 0.55 respectively. 
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tax authorities.  As in Table 4, the economic effect is thus larger for financial outreach than 
for financial depth. 
The results reported Appendix Table A3 show that the effect of financial outreach is 
stronger for smaller firms, while we only find an effect of financial depth for larger firms.  
Here, we split the sample into firms below and above the 25
th
 percentile of fixed assets for a 
specific industry and year. While estimates become less precise for the sample below the 25
th
 
percentile, the relative economic size of the effects of financial depth and outreach is 
confirmed. In the case of firms above the 25
th
 percentile, only the interaction of external 
finance with our measure of financial depth, Credit to SDP, enters positively and significantly 
in the regressions. This suggests that larger firms in industries relying on external finance do 
not benefit from higher branch penetration, but rather from overall financial depth, as 
captured by credit volume on the state level.
 8
  
One concern regarding the impact of financial development on informality is the reverse 
causation in the sense that lower informality leads to higher demand for financial services, 
especially in industries with higher need for external finance. To control for this effect, in 
Appendix Table A4, we re-estimate Table 5 for the sample of industries that are below the 
median of production level in the respective state and year. The results suggest that even if 
we exclude the larger industries in each state that can create such a demand effect, the 
interaction of RZ with both financial penetration and financial deepening are positively 
associated with registration rates.  
While Table 5 considers only the share of firms, we now turn to alternative indicators of 
informality as dependent variables. In Table 6, instead of the share of formal firms, we use 
                                                 
8
 If we include both financial outreach and depth in a single regression in Table 5, for the sample of small firms 
(fixed asset < 25th percentile), branches per capita is positive and significant while credit to SDP becomes 
insignificant. In contrast, when the sample contains large firms (fixed asset > 25th percentile), credit to SDP is 
significant, while branches per capita is not. 
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value-added and employment share of formal firms in total as dependent variables. 
Specifically, we present results with (i) the log of share of value added produced by firms 
registered under any act or the tax act (columns 1 to 4) and (ii) the log of share of 
employment in firms registered under any act or the tax act (columns 5 to 8), with the 
interaction of financial development and external dependence as the main explanatory 
variable of interest.  
The results in Table 6 show that while financial depth is positively and significantly 
associated with the share of formally produced value added and the employment share of firm 
registered under any act or tax, there is no significant impact of financial breadth on the share 
of value added or employment in formally registered firms.  Specifically, the interaction term 
between Credit to SDP and external dependence enters positively and significantly at least at 
the 5 percent level in all four regressions, while the interactions of branch penetration and 
external dependence do not enter significantly in any of the regressions.  This suggests that 
although financial outreach pushes the informal firms into the formal sector, it does not 
necessarily improve their value-added or production. Moreover, the results suggest that the 
effect of financial deepening on informality is through improving value-added and 
employment of formal sector firms, rather than through pulling more firms into the formal 
sector. 
Insert Table 6 here 
So far, we have focused on the relative importance of formal and informal sectors within 
manufacturing.  We now turn our attention to production and value added in the formal and 
informal sectors to test the link between financial development and the second channel 
outlined above, i.e. the higher productivity of firms in the formal sector. We therefore use as 
dependent variable total production or total value added on the state-industry level for all 
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firms, registered firms and unregistered firms. Specifically, Table 7 illustrates the result of 
estimation of equation (2) for log of production (panel A) and value-added (panel B).  
The results in Panel A of Table 7 show that total production and production in registered 
firms increases with Credit to SDP in industries that depend more on external finance, while 
total production of unregistered firms is not significantly associated with the interaction of 
external dependence and Credit to SDP suggesting a positive and significant impact of 
financial deepening on production of firms registered under any act or tax, but not of informal 
firms. On the other hand, the interaction term of branches per capita does not enter 
significantly in any of the specifications. The results in Panel B of Table 7 show that total 
value added of registered firms increases across industries with a higher need for external 
finance as financial systems deepen, while value-added of informal firms and total value-





 percentiles, the economic effect of credit to SDP interacted with RZ 
on the value-added of firms registered under any act is 0.641×log(0.36/0.19)×0.36=0.147 
which is 32% of the de-trended standard deviation of the dependent variables (0.46). The 
effect for tax registered firms is 0.995× log(0.36/0.19)×0.36=0.229 accounting for 44% of de-
trended standard deviation (0.52). As in Panel A, the interaction terms of branch penetration 
and external dependence do not enter significantly.  
In summary, our empirical findings suggest an important impact of financial sector 
development on the incidence of formality.  This impact works through different channels, 
with different dimensions of financial sector development dominating specific channels.  
Specifically, we find that branch penetration, i.e. outreach by financial institutions, is 
associated with a lower incidence of informality mainly through the extensive margin by 
helping or persuading informal firms to enter the formal sector. Financial deepening, on the 
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other hand, as proxied by Credit to SDP, increases the productivity of formal sector and 
reduces informality mainly through this channel. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper explores the relationship between financial sector development and the 
relative importance of formal and informal manufacturing in India.  Previous work and theory 
suggest an impact of financial development on both extensive and intensive margins, i.e. 
pulling more firms into the formal sector and increasing total production of the formal sector. 
Our results provide evidence for both channels, but also distinct roles for financial depth, as 
proxied by Credit to SDP, and financial outreach, as proxied by branch penetration. 
Specifically, exploiting variation within state-years and industries with different needs for 
external finance, we find that financial outreach is positively associated with a higher share of 
formal enterprises, especially in industries with a higher demand for external finance, i.e. 
where firms benefit more from access to formal finance.   While we also find a positive effect 
of financial depth on the share of formal firms, this effect is of a smaller size.  In terms of 
production efficiency, on the other hand, we find a positive and significant role for financial 
depth, especially in industries more reliant on external finance, while no significant effect for 
branch penetration. 
Together, these results suggest an important role for finance in reducing informality, 
though with important differences across industries. They also suggests that policies aimed at 
deepening the financial system as much as policies aimed at increasing outreach are 
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Figure 2- Two effects of financial development on informality: (A) reducing barriers to 
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Figure 5- Registration rate vs. financial breadth and depth averaged over states for the 
Sample of firms with fixed assets below 25
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Figure 7- Production, financial dependence and financial deepening in formal sector 
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Table 1- list of surveys and the number of samples 
year 1989-90 1994-95 2000-01 2005-06 2010-11 
No. sample in ASI 49,323 57,908 37,055 49,637 46,843 




Table 2.A- Summary of informality measures (weights are applied) 
 name Description 1989 1994 2000 2005 2010 
(1) Reg percentage of registered under any act 8.32 11.81 10.72 10.44 15.19 
(2) Treg percentage of registered under tax 
 
1.21 1.71 1.81 3.34 
(3) Vreg VA share of registered under any act (%) 81.95 83.91 81.05 87.45 92.74 
(4) Vtreg VA share of registered under tax (%) 
 
76.59 71.42 80.92 88.95 
(5) Ereg employment of registered under any act (%) 26.50 34.57 32.96 33.70 46.88 
(6) Etreg employment of registered under tax (%) 
 
22.41 19.40 21.69 33.12 
 
Table 2.B- Comparison of informality measures with official estimations. The base year for the first three rows is 2005. The last row is to be 
compared with row (4) in Table 2.A. 
  1989 1994 2000 2005 2010 
Official Manufacturing GDP 38.9 49.3 72.8 100 160.6 
Gross output 33.4 50.4 65.6 100 178.1 
Gross value added 35.8 47.5 59.5 100 193.1 
Official Registered Man. GDP (%) 
 























Enf. exp.  











Mean 11.34 2.05 3.65 3.26 2.60 1.76 -1.229 0.718 9.802 0.191 -0.599 0.068 0.782 
Standard error 14.73 5.28 0.90 1.25 1.25 1.55 0.562 0.220 0.780 0.061 0.689 0.279 0.509 
De-trended SD 
across:   
    
  
   
  
state 11.37 3.66 0.71 0.93 0.95 1.10 0.443 0.212 0.733 0.059 0.647 0.064 0.167 
year  7.18 2.92 0.40 0.50 0.49 0.52 0.307 0.055 0.420 0.022 0.390 0.053 0.275 
industry 12.14 4.88 0.70 1.06 0.94 1.29 0 0 0 0 0 0.265 0.491 
state-year 6.65 2.40 0.36 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.138 0.045 0.363 0.020 0.363 0.040 0.147 
state-industry 8.79 3.34 0.50 0.75 0.67 0.85 0.098 0.039 0.129 0.009 0.146 0.090 0.176 
year-industry 6.24 2.76 0.35 0.45 0.42 0.46 0.127 0.017 0.146 0.007 0.119 0.069 0.270 
state-year-
industry 
5.82 2.31 0.33 0.43 0.40 0.44 0.084 0.025 0.143 0.008 0.130 0.050 0.154 
 














Mean 15.08 14.46 14.39 13.59 14.03 13.08 12.86 13.02 
Standard error 1.46 1.96 2.17 1.29 1.20 1.80 2.05 1.22 
De-trended SE across: 
        
state 1.05 1.41 1.57 0.95 0.95 1.38 1.57 0.92 
year  0.45 0.60 0.55 0.47 0.45 0.66 0.71 0.45 
industry 1.08 1.44 1.69 0.99 0.81 1.24 1.52 0.93 
state-year 0.31 0.43 0.45 0.41 0.32 0.50 0.55 0.39 
state-industry 0.61 0.80 0.99 0.58 0.55 0.81 1.04 0.57 
year-industry 0.36 0.48 0.51 0.42 0.36 0.52 0.55 0.40 




Table 3.B: correlation table. Number of firms is applied as weights. 
 
 







Enf. exp.  










Treg 0.600***            
Vreg 0.460*** 0.301***           
Vtreg 0.314*** 0.291*** 0.850***          
Ereg 0.667*** 0.399*** 0.803*** 0.597***         
Etreg 0.512*** 0.428*** 0.826*** 0.850*** 0.849***        
Credit to SDP (log) 0.293*** 0.213*** 0.370*** 0.324*** 0.377*** 0.366***       
Branch per capita 0.314*** 0.240*** 0.267*** 0.205*** 0.333*** 0.312*** 0.575***      
Enf. exp. per firm (log) 0.291*** 0.188*** 0.219*** 0.119*** 0.310*** 0.231*** 0.619*** 0.583***     
SDP per capita (log) -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.14*** -0.156*** -0.16*** 0.0383** -0.0397**    
Gov. exp. / SDP 0.178*** 0.122*** 0.189*** 0.110*** 0.219*** 0.160*** 0.161*** 0.161*** 0.0626*** 0.0404**   
RZ index 0.244*** 0.231*** -0.06*** -0.09*** 0.142*** 0.0795*** -0.11*** -0.00353 -0.062*** 0.0218 0.0163  













Table 4- Financial depth vs. breadth and barriers to formality. state, year, and industry fixed effects are included in all regressions. 
Number of firms is applied as weight in all regressions and standard errors are clustered at state level. 
 
 




proportion of registered under 
any act 
proportion of registered 
under tax 
proportion of registered under 
any act 
proportion of registered 
under tax 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 




























Log (SDP pc) 16.608 8.437 -1.406 -3.287 0.330 0.471 -0.436*** -0.197 
 
(20.047) (18.826) (5.224) (5.092) (0.535) (0.525) (0.143) (0.120) 
Government exp. / SDP -0.591 -0.404 0.155 0.293* -11.148 -16.447 5.375 0.602 
 
(0.919) (0.874) (0.201) (0.155) (10.275) (10.174) (10.221) (9.798) 








(0.909) (0.357) (0.304) (0.311) (0.391) 
Constant 6.391 26.943 26.015** 31.673*** 14.862 36.932*** 10.629 27.808** 
 
(17.722) (19.940) (9.665) (9.357) (8.827) (10.166) (10.986) (10.768) 
Observations 3024 3024 2717 2717 2673 2673 2384 2384 








Table 5- The effect of financial dependence and forward linkages on registration. Difference-in-differences estimation: State × year, 
and industry fixed effects are included in all regressions. Number of firms is applied as weight in all regressions and standard errors are clustered 
at state level. 
 
 
proportion of registered under any act proportion of registered under tax 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


































RZ × log(SDP pc) -1.871* 0.198 -1.702 0.454 -0.238 0.426 -0.129 0.494* 
 
(1.069) (1.022) (1.058) (0.967) (0.338) (0.290) (0.342) (0.281) 
RZ × Government exp./SDP -38.106 19.786 -37.198 24.102 -5.135 5.347 -5.219 5.509 
 
(37.479) (44.733) (38.896) (47.623) (13.400) (11.109) (12.656) (10.665) 


















Constant 30.849*** 30.858*** 43.168*** 40.184*** 30.751*** 30.539*** 31.150*** 29.936** 
 
(8.773) (8.272) (10.474) (10.687) (10.977) (10.951) (11.211) (11.229) 
Observations 2526 2526 2366 2366 2189 2189 2125 2125 









Table 6- The effect of financial dependence on formal value-added and employment: Difference-in-differences estimation:state × year, 
and industry fixed effects are included in all regressions. Number of firms is applied as weight in all regressions and standard errors are clustered 
at state level. All dependent variables are in logarithmic form. 
 
 
VA share of registered under 
any act 
VA share of registered 
under tax 
employment share of registered 
under any act 
employment share of registered 
under tax 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 

































RZ × log(SDP pc) -0.079 -0.074 -0.049 -0.032 -0.127 -0.130** -0.036 -0.055 
 
(0.083) (0.064) (0.098) (0.094) (0.083) (0.047) (0.141) (0.097) 
FL × Enforcement 
exp./No. firms 
-0.070 -0.085 -0.050 -0.069 -0.006 -0.024 -0.027 -0.060 
 
(0.053) (0.059) (0.086) (0.094) (0.063) (0.075) (0.102) (0.119) 
FL × log(SDP pc) 0.008 0.008 0.017 0.018 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.011) (0.010) 
RZ × Government 
exp./SDP 
-1.370 0.627 -1.121 2.541 -0.803 1.593 -3.732 1.768 
 
(2.269) (2.286) (3.303) (2.776) (1.976) (2.796) (4.640) (3.497) 
Constant 3.752*** 3.592*** 2.709*** 2.351*** 3.396*** 3.205*** 3.000*** 2.473*** 
 
(0.520) (0.546) (0.463) (0.558) (0.418) (0.419) (0.438) (0.424) 
Observations 2307 2307 1927 1927 2306 2306 1925 1925 









Table 7- Financial depth vs. breadth and Productivity: Difference-in-differences estimation: state × year, and industry fixed effects are 
included in all regressions. Number of firms is applied as weight in all regressions and standard errors are clustered at state level. All dependent 
variables are in logarithmic form.  
 
Panel A: Production 
 
Production Production of registered Production of tax registered Production of unregistered 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


































RZ × log(SDP pc) -0.053 -0.091 -0.130 -0.184 -0.104 -0.184 -0.099 -0.120 
 
(0.078) (0.100) (0.107) (0.129) (0.131) (0.145) (0.064) (0.085) 
RZ × Government exp./SDP 4.109 1.359 4.799 0.086 6.685 0.688 2.941 2.789 
 
(2.773) (3.278) (3.620) (4.375) (4.623) (5.443) (2.752) (2.499) 
Constant 9.761*** 9.809*** 9.025*** 9.114*** 9.458*** 10.128*** 7.795*** 7.784*** 
 
(0.583) (0.578) (0.643) (0.685) (0.754) (0.680) (0.506) (0.516) 
Observations 2520 2520 2459 2459 1978 1978 2128 2128 











Panel B: Value added 
 
Value-Added Value-Added of registered Value-Added of tax registered Value-Added of unregistered 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


































RZ × log(SDP pc) 0.004 -0.033 -0.089 -0.141 -0.028 -0.114 -0.060 -0.083 
 
(0.068) (0.100) (0.103) (0.140) (0.143) (0.163) (0.062) (0.086) 
RZ × Government exp./SDP 2.776 1.424 3.396 0.070 6.061 0.411 2.882 3.410 
 
(2.588) (2.908) (3.896) (4.420) (5.087) (6.056) (2.761) (2.526) 
Constant 8.546*** 8.555*** 7.353*** 7.397*** 7.387*** 7.997*** 7.489*** 7.455*** 
 
(0.442) (0.439) (0.315) (0.367) (0.717) (0.816) (0.538) (0.567) 
Observations 2476 2476 2403 2403 1912 1912 2125 2125 










Table A1 – summary statistic of each industry 
NIC Description Obs. % Reg Treg Vreg Vtreg Ereg Etreg RZ FL 
1 relating activities to agriculture 5,228 0.55 30.80 32.69 97.90 91.25 88.64 75.38 -0.09 1.80 
14 relating activities to mining and quarrying 110 0.01 100 100 100 100 100 100 
  
15 food products and beverages 152,950 15.98 20.09 2.03 80.12 62.90 36.86 17.62 0.14 0.53 
16 tobacco products 49,885 5.21 3.13 0.48 66.63 58.02 16.25 11.62 -0.45 0.27 
17 Textiles 130,084 13.59 7.78 1.45 79.72 61.28 30.26 16.55 0.11 0.84 
18 wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur 103,045 10.76 7.77 0.50 52.84 38.72 22.55 11.30 -0.14 0.39 
19 leather and related products 15,001 1.57 10.34 2.94 69.40 58.95 37.41 25.31 -0.09 0.87 
20 wood and wood products 85,478 8.93 3.37 0.72 31.02 16.37 7.84 2.35 0.28 1.51 
21 paper and paper products 9,812 1.03 12.91 5.94 95.46 82.78 54.81 39.88 0.18 1.51 
22 publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 14,595 1.52 50.58 8.89 90.83 67.95 69.90 29.04 0.20 1.02 
23 coke and refined petroleum 2,273 0.24 56.11 40.63 99.87 96.19 91.48 76.12 0.31 1.61 
24 chemical and chemical products 29,452 3.08 13.01 7.71 99.23 91.92 68.59 54.96 0.26 1.19 
25 rubber and plastic products 13,401 1.4 34.17 13.40 95.53 83.87 72.19 50.19 0.97 1.78 
26 other non-metallic mineral products 62,550 6.53 9.10 4.54 88.98 77.16 41.11 25.53 -0.08 0.81 
27 basic metals 16,239 1.7 43.51 21.38 99.52 96.00 91.06 79.80 0.03 2.07 
28 fabricated metal 46,821 4.89 23.28 4.60 83.27 65.03 48.17 22.82 0.24 1.21 
29 machinery and equipment 31,093 3.25 26.51 8.44 95.86 82.51 68.12 44.65 0.46 0.76 
30 office and computing machinery 676 0.07 70.10 39.44 99.85 87.80 97.86 74.72 1.06 
 
31 electrical machinery 12,092 1.26 38.73 12.58 98.17 85.33 83.01 59.84 0.77 0.74 
32 radio, television and communication 4,467 0.47 50.72 25.61 99.03 86.97 91.43 69.72 1.04 0.56 
33 medical, precision and optical instruments 3,789 0.4 50.68 19.52 97.98 86.02 86.79 63.52 0.96 0.68 
34 motor vehicles 6,513 0.68 61.73 26.26 99.44 92.48 94.60 79.78 0.39 0.44 
35 other transport equipments 6,373 0.67 46.69 14.65 98.61 85.52 90.08 61.80 0.35 1.18 
36 Furniture 89,795 9.38 15.36 1.72 56.35 33.50 24.86 6.02 0.35 0.82 
37 Recycling 561 0.06 26.62 2.51 82.17 56.35 52.05 16.84 
  
40 electricity gas and water supply 1,029 0.11 100 100 100 70.68 100 51.53 
 
1.41 
41 purification of water 459 0.05 100 100 100 58.73 100 66.80 
  
50 repair of motor vehicles 16,384 1.71 23.62 3.94 86.84 74.45 49.26 26.84 
 
0.53 
52 repair of household goods 42,463 4.44 10.67 0.16 25.64 5.38 15.03 0.65 
 
0.76 
63 supporting transport activities 1,923 0.2 100 100 100 97.41 100.00 94.24 
 
1.52 
72 repair of computer and related activities 1,731 0.18 33.85 2.16 90.26 86.18 69.04 52.21 
 
1.14 
90 sewage and refuse disposal 225 0.02 100 100 100 100 100 100 
  






Table A2– summary statistic for each state 
Code State name 
Est. no. 
enterprises 











1 Jammu & Kashmir 874,055 14.20 1.04 69.69 52.30 27.61 9.25 0.36 0.91 12727 0.563 0.113 
2 Himachal Pradesh 556,354 19.01 2.60 96.12 90.67 48.42 28.40 0.24 1.40 19553 0.381 0.232 
3 Punjab 1,578,964 16.20 4.74 88.89 75.45 56.79 37.86 0.34 1.17 32530 0.183 0.160 
4 Chandigarh 24,927 37.10 14.98 94.82 73.97 77.95 45.78 1.35 2.61 80935   
5 Uttaranchal 492,602 18.89 2.05 96.18 93.33 49.48 32.75 0.35 1.15 32898 0.285 0.293 
6 Haryana 967,794 13.24 4.67 92.97 83.49 59.49 44.87 0.26 0.83 32811 0.174 0.168 
7 Delhi 807,522 18.71 4.83 63.08 45.01 34.40 17.48 1.27 1.28 55218 0.071 4.803 
8 Rajasthan 3,014,103 7.27 1.89 82.92 71.64 30.93 19.13 0.28 0.65 13933 0.222 0.207 
9 Uttar Pradesh 11,700,000 6.74 1.06 77.89 61.80 23.11 12.62 0.19 0.53 12925 0.184 0.139 
10 Bihar 3,889,572 5.30 0.36 58.21 37.33 15.96 6.42 0.12 0.42 8677 0.178 0.121 
11 Sikkim 10,164 23.56 2.46 98.97 97.14 59.00 36.63 0.20 0.97 25125 1.119 1.364 
12 Arunachal Pradesh 8,168 28.21 1.41 63.34 11.00 61.65 6.14 0.12 0.70 16663 0.538 0.658 
13 Nagaland 36,948 14.94 1.67 65.63 38.36 39.53 17.19 0.11 0.44 17167 0.574 0.919 
14 Manipur 241,327 1.68 0.30 26.34 18.19 7.04 3.24 0.11 0.34 11599 0.508 0.114 
15 Mizoram 23,176 22.47 0.35 53.14 1.13 34.53 0.57 0.16 0.90 17605 0.787 1.279 
16 Tripura 246,742 7.81 1.09 59.31 42.05 22.61 12.27 0.16 0.62 15087 0.476 0.111 
17 Meghalaya 122,637 9.36 0.77 69.86 58.36 22.51 8.22 0.27 0.80 14593 0.391 0.288 
18 Assam 1,342,032 9.51 0.95 77.91 62.35 30.24 17.23 0.16 0.49 12547 0.240 0.149 
19 West Bengal 13,000,000 8.16 1.24 73.63 55.46 23.71 10.59 0.32 0.61 18285 0.168 0.053 
20 Jharkhand 2,061,750 2.47 0.54 87.02 85.81 15.09 12.12 0.25 0.55 17261 0.278 0.114 
21 Orissa 4,935,742 1.33 0.32 80.66 69.43 9.01 6.23 0.23 0.65 10787 0.226 0.071 
22 Chhattisgarh 970,077 8.89 1.44 93.22 90.00 28.14 16.88 0.27 0.52 23710 0.216 0.290 
23 Madhya Pradesh 3,493,148 9.72 1.31 88.75 74.24 29.21 16.09 0.23 0.57 17610 0.174 0.366 
24 Gujrat 3,792,198 25.79 5.07 93.50 81.69 56.42 31.44 0.33 0.82 35153 0.169 0.091 








27 Maharastra 5,690,878 27.18 4.49 94.72 79.82 59.11 31.24 0.66 0.79 35062 0.144 0.462 
28 Andhra Pardesh 7,648,296 9.21 2.00 85.20 75.00 34.05 23.28 0.36 0.76 22080 0.180 0.090 
29 Karnataka 4,554,846 13.55 2.02 90.30 77.81 40.24 23.20 0.49 0.98 20221 0.195 0.105 
30 Goa 67,314 42.35 18.52 98.97 92.81 77.22 56.15 0.29 3.26 59411 0.239 0.273 




32 Kerala 2,565,822 21.94 3.49 87.28 62.73 52.18 25.12 0.42 1.14 21569 0.220 0.178 
33 Tamil Nadu 7,258,991 13.50 2.75 89.48 74.52 46.26 27.85 0.55 0.85 24449 0.189 0.085 
34 Pondicheri 58,558 20.92 7.22 97.82 92.74 71.36 51.93 0.28 1.15 42335 0.358 0.448 




Table A3- The effect of financial dependence and forward linkages on registration; sample splits according to size. State × year, and 
industry fixed effects are included in all regressions. Number of firms is applied as weight in all regressions and standard errors are clustered at 
state level. 
Panel A: Fixed asset < 25th percentile of respective industry and year 
 
proportion of registered under any act proportion of registered under tax 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


































RZ × log(SDP pc) -1.256 0.217 -0.971 0.472 0.004 0.436*** 0.171 0.538*** 
 
(1.194) (0.520) (1.153) (0.507) (0.236) (0.134) (0.238) (0.143) 
RZ × Government exp./SDP -3.078 26.169 -4.032 27.394 -1.697 7.675 -1.545 8.480 
 
(21.821) (30.784) (22.493) (32.545) (6.190) (6.183) (5.512) (5.900) 


















Constant 16.890** 17.114** 26.057** 22.450* 20.418** 20.139** 22.312** 20.867** 
 
(6.940) (6.882) (11.799) (12.843) (9.283) (9.307) (9.942) (10.019) 
Observations 2306 2306 2174 2174 1983 1983 1941 1941 






Panel B: Fixed asset > 25th percentile of respective industry and year 
 
proportion of registered under any act proportion of registered under tax 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


































RZ × log(SDP pc) -0.841 -0.137 -0.758 0.003 -0.051 0.385 0.021 0.434 
 
(1.106) (1.125) (1.050) (1.043) (0.461) (0.373) (0.443) (0.359) 
RZ × Government exp./SDP -38.003 12.075 -34.083 16.343 -1.205 5.705 -1.641 5.497 
 
(43.262) (51.721) (43.245) (51.963) (16.145) (14.484) (15.806) (14.321) 


















Constant 62.814*** 62.670*** 72.274*** 69.238*** 58.524*** 57.773*** 55.502*** 55.144*** 
 
(10.147) (10.220) (11.056) (11.127) (12.507) (12.543) (12.238) (12.300) 
Observations 2458 2458 2306 2306 2127 2127 2065 2065 









Table A4- The effect of financial dependence and forward linkages on registration; sample of small industries. The sample includes 
industries below median of total production in each state and year (the biggest half of industries in each state and year is excluded). State × year, 
and industry fixed effects are included in all regressions. Number of firms is applied as weight in all regressions and standard errors are clustered 
at state level. 
 
proportion of registered under any act proportion of registered under tax 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 





























RZ × log(SDP pc) -0.808 -1.376 -0.964 -1.186 -0.395 0.228 -0.584 0.128 
 (1.237) (1.240) (1.229) (1.312) (0.416) (0.213) (0.397) (0.261) 
RZ × Government exp./SDP -16.706 59.110 -25.143 54.854 -9.183 3.265 -11.510 2.878 
 (34.424) (38.472) (28.689) (36.305) (10.758) (12.028) (10.288) (11.567) 




















Constant 9.983* 8.693 63.374*** 59.002*** 20.782* 20.413 18.804 18.323 
 (4.910) (5.249) (16.518) (16.130) (12.159) (12.090) (11.991) (11.952) 
Observations 1045 1045 940 940 893 893 837 837 
R-squared 0.754 0.768 0.765 0.778 0.482 0.479 0.487 0.483 
 
 
